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Abstract 
This articles approaches the notion of an Islamic social contract from the perspective of the 
Berber inhabitants of the Maghrib and their concern that the state should be just, with a 
particular focus on the period between 1050 and 1250 when the region was ruled by two 
successsive indigenous imperial regimes, the Almoravids and the Almohads. It explores the 
gradual implantation of ideas of Islamic statehood in the region, their intersection with 
earlier indigenous beliefs and social practices, and the ‘naturalisation’ of Islamic 
philosophical ideas developed in the ʿAbbasid East and al-Andalus in the very different 
environment of the Maghrib. Two ideas of particular salience to the discussion are the 
Almoravid idea of a Mālikī ‘Commander of Truth or Law’, the amīr al-ḥaqq, and Almohad 
references to a utopian perfect city or polis, al-madīna al-fāḍila, in the context of their 
recognition of their spiritual father, Ibn Tūmart, as the mahdī. 
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Introduction 
This article considers some aspects of the relations between different groups within 
society in the medieval Maghrib from the theoretical and practical perspectives. While the 
most evident contract in medieval Islamic society was arguably the dhimma or covenant 
extended to the peoples of the book to practice their religions in return for obedience and 
payment of the jizya tax to Muslim authorities, the concept of a social contract also implies 
the range of assumptions, stated or unstated, which inform people’s acceptance of 
particular social and political forms as normative. For the average person, prosperity and 
peace were key desiderata but for Muslim thinkers, religion was an inescapable aspect of life 
and a good society was never simply one that provided for people’s earthly needs but also 
one that led its people to salvation. These two concerns may be seen to be encapsulated in 
the terms justice, ʿadl or qisṭ, and virtue, faḍl which figure repeatedly in the political 
philosophy of the tenth-century Islamic philosopher, al-Fārābī (d. c. 339/950). His work 
interacted with Arabic versions of Aristotelian, Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophy and 
found readers and commentators in the Islamic west as well as the east, notably the 
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Andalusi philosopher, Ibn Bājja (d. 534/1139), who served the Almoravids for a time.  
Al-Fārābī used the term ‘virtuous city’, al-madīna al-fāḍila, for a perfect society which 
was one that led its inhabitants to earthly and eternal happiness. Like other thinkers, he 
believed that the management of such a community required a ruler (raʾīs) who functioned 
as the conduit between a higher power, whether understood as the Active Intellect or God, 
and the ruled. While cities, peoples (umam) and universal empires (al-maʿmūra) could be 
virtuous, urban quarters, villages and by implication other rural constituencies such as 
tribes could not, because a perfect society was like a healthy body and required the same 
diverse range of specialisms for its full realisation.1 Such philosophical constructs gave a 
paramount position to the ruler, the physician of the soul, but also imposed upon him 
ultimate responsibility for the welfare of those who served rather than participated in 
governance according to their skills and abilities. This vision was abstract, utopian and 
little concerned with the non-urban, and tension always existed between such hierarchical 
urban formulations and the much flatter, egalitarian structure implied by the early Islamic 
idea of the community of believers which had emerged from the meeting of Semitic 
monotheism and Arabian tribalism.2 In what follows, I shall consider the evolution of 
Islamic statehood in the rural Maghrib, a tribal society like Arabia, and how by the twelfth 
century CE, a Maghribī tribal people had incorporated the theoretical notion of a virtuous 
(urban) society, al-madīna al-fāḍila, into their state ideology. 
 
The evolution of Islamic statehood in the Maghrib 
The development of Islamic statehood and concomitant ideas of the ethical relations 
that should exist between ruler and ruled followed a complicated path in the Maghrib 
which reflected numerous intersections between tribal society, pre-Islamic beliefs, 
sectarian Muslim positions, and religio-political universalism as understood in ʿAbbasid 
Baghdad or Umayyad Córdoba. The Islamic conquest itself was a long drawn-out process 
that involved ongoing interactions between two tribal peoples, the Arab invaders and the 
indigenous Maghribīs, the latter of whom came to be lumped together in Arabic writing as 
the Berbers although they did not see themselves as a single ‘race’.3 Indigenous tribes 
fought the newcomers, allied with them and rebelled against them. Such high levels of 
                                                        
1 R. Walzer, Al-Farabi on the Perfect State: Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī’s ‘Mabādiʾ Ārāʾ Ahl al-Madīna al-
Fāḍila’, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1985), pp. 228-37. See also C. Butterworth, Alfarabi The 
Political Writings: Selected Aphorisms and other Texts, London and Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press (2001), pp. 12-13, 25-28. 
2 See Louise Marlow, Hierarchy and Egalitarianism in Islamic Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press (1997). 
3 For a discussion of Arab conceptualisations of the Berbers, see Ramzi Rouighi, ‘The 
Berbers of the Arabs’, Studia Islamica 106: 1 (2011), pp. 49-76. 
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conflict slowed the pace of conquest but also generated intimacy through recruitment and 
the capture of Berber prisoners, male and female, who entered Arab Muslim ranks in a way 
that sedentary peasant populations, many of whom were Christian and thus inscribed in 
the new order as tax-paying ahl al-dhimma, did not.  
As a result, the early relationship between the Arab warrior aristocracy, headed by 
the Umayyad caliph in Damascus, and the population of the Maghrib was not a simple 
equation of Muslim Arab ‘ruler’ and non-Muslim Berber ‘ruled’. Berbers could be elite 
Muslim clients in the upper echelons of power such as Ṭāriq b. Ziyād, the conqueror of 
Iberia, fighters within the larger ruling elite, captives and slaves, including concubines, or 
tribes who were not subjugated or ‘ruled’ in any real sense. This parallelism between Arab 
and Berber power structures encouraged similar responses to the evolving Muslim state in 
its theoretical and practical manifestations. While Islam as a religious system based on a 
Prophet and a revealed book had evident appeal,4 a deeply rooted tribal distrust of 
authoritarianism, hierarchy and hereditary succession encouraged Berbers within the 
fledgling Islamic state structure to listen with a sympathetic ear to Kharijite missionaries 
calling for the maintenance of the primitive Islamic state with its quasi-tribal preference 
for a leader chosen for chiefly merits such as military prowess, political acumen and 
generosity, regardless of his genealogy.  
Although the Kharijites had some success in Iraq, their greatest victory came in the 
Maghrib where numerous Berber fighters joined the widespread Kharijite rebellion of 739-
41 which effectively ended Umayyad rule from Qayrawan to Ceuta and ultimately led to the 
formation of the first indigenous Muslim states in North Africa, the Ibāḍī Rustamid 
imamate with its capital at Tahart (Algeria), and the Ṣufrī Midrarid principality based at 
Sijilmasa (Morocco), both of which were supported by particular tribal coalitions. The 
Ibāḍīs, in particular, promoted a vision of Islamic statehood predicated on the leadership of 
a just and learned imam, even if this often proved to be an aspiration rather than a reality.5 
The various biographies of Ibn Rustam, for instance, concur that he was selected by a 
convocation of Ibāḍī tribal chiefs who agreed that he was ‘pious’ and ‘knowledgeable’.6 His 
frugal lifestyle, generosity, and even-handed treatment of tribal disputes are also noted as 
marks of a good ruler. 
An ʿAlid strand soon appeared too, personified in Idrīs b. ʿAbd Allāh, Ḥasan b. ʿAlī’s 
great grandson and a missionary for the ʿAlid cause, or a refugee from ʿAbbasid persecution, 
                                                        
4 Michael Brett, ‘The Islamisation of Morocco from the Arabs to the Almoravids’ in idem, Ibn 
Khaldūn and Medieval Maghrib, Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum, 1999, Chapter I, p. 67.  
5 For an analysis of the Ibāḍī imamate, see Adam Gaiser, Muslims, Scholars, Soldiers: the origin 
and elaboration of the Ibāḍī imamate traditions, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2010). 
6 Virginie Prevost, ‘ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Rustum al-Fārisī. Une tentative de biographie du 
premier imam de Tāhart’, Der Islam 86 (2011): 44-64, pp. 55-6. 
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or possibly both.7 Idrīs inserted himself into the Berber milieu as the imam of the Awraba 
Berbers of the Meknes-Zarhun region in the 780s and founded Fes. After his premature 
death, his client Rāshid supposedly persuaded the Awraba tribesmen to acknowledge his 
posthumous son, Idrīs II, whose descendants each ruled a different township and set of 
tribes within a loose Idrisid confederation. Although we know little about how the Idrisids 
or the Awraba conceptualised their relationship, the perception of genealogical charisma 
inherent in the descendants of the prophet is likely to have played a significant role in the 
emergence of their imamate. In this case, however, we may also surmise that the 
indigenous Maghribī mother of Idrīs II, the Nafza Berber Kanza, passed over in the Arabic 
chronicles as a maternal vessel, may have been a more powerful player in the perpetuation 
of the Idrīsī ‘priesthood’ than we realise, a point we shall explore further below. A vestige 
of this role may be reflected in Ibn Abī Zarʿ’s allusion to Kanza advising her grandson, 
Muḥammad b. Idrīs, to give his brothers shares in his patrimony.  
When Muḥammad came to power he divided the Maghrib between his brothers 
according to the advice of his grandmother Kanza, his father’s mother.8 
 
Charismatic leadership rooted within particular tribes or tribal confederations can 
also be seen in the syncretic cults that emerged from the encounter of early Islamic rituals 
and beliefs with indigenous tribal cults. At the meeting point between Kharijism and cults 
practised on the Tamesna plain, which may have included a form of Judaism, the 
Barghawāṭa cult emerged, based on the notion of a Berber prophet, a Berber Qurʾān and 
prayer, fasting and feasting rituals which slightly altered those followed by the Arabs. 
Further south below the High Atlas, a mysterious descendant of Idrīs became the imam, 
championed by an equally mysterious Berber individual from the eastern Maghrib called 
Muḥammad b. Warsand al-Bajalī who encouraged some tribes of the Sus valley to blend 
local beliefs with Idrisid allegiance, thereby creating the Bajaliyya cult.  
 
Muḥammad b. Warsand summoned them to curse the ṣaḥāba – may God be 
satisfied with them – and made forbidden things licit for them…they still follow 
his teaching (madhhab) today and [believe] that the imamate belongs to the 
                                                        
7 Although perceived from the Marinid era onwards as Sunni monarchs, Beck has 
demonstrated that this represents a rewriting of history and that the Idrisids, as one would 
expect given their genealogy, were ʿAlid or proto-Shīʿī in orientation. Herman Beck, l’Image 
d’Idrīs II, ses descendants de Fās et la politique sharīfienne des sultans marīnides, 656-869/1258-1465, 
Leiden: Brill, 1989. 
8 ʿAlī b. Abī Zarʿ, Al-Anīs al-Muṭrib bi-Rawḍ al-Qirṭās fī Akhbār Mulūk al-Maghrib wa-Tārīkh 
Madīnat Fās, edited by Abdelwahab Benmansour, second edition, Rabat: Imprimerie Royale, 
1999, p. 62. 
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progeny of al-Ḥasan not al-Ḥusayn. Their lord (ṣāḥibuhum) is Idrīs Abū’l-Qāsim b. 
Muḥammad b. Jaʿfar b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Idrīs.9  
 
A similar pattern occurred, perhaps slightly later, in the northern Rif mountains 
among the Ghumāra tribes who adopted one of their own, Ḥā Mīm, as another Berber 
prophet bringing an adapted Berber Qurʾān and distinct but Islamising prayer and fasting 
rituals. One intriguing feature of the cult of Ḥā Mīm was the prominent role played within 
it by women who are so often absent from the male-dominated Arabic written corpus. Ḥā 
Mīm’s aunt and sister are both mentioned as soothsayers within the cult and belief in his 
aunt, Tālīt or Tāngīt, is described by al-Bakrī as standing alongside belief in Ḥā Mīm himself 
as an object of faith.10  
 
He gave them a scripture (qurʿān) in their tongue… In it [it said], ‘I believe in Ḥā 
Mīm and Abī Khalaf’, by which they meant the father of Ḥā Mīm who was known 
by that term of respect (kunya), ‘and my head, my reason, and that which my 
breast conceals and my blood and flesh encase believes in Tāngīt’, the aunt of Ḥā 
Mīm and the sister of Abī Khalaf Mann Allāh who was a soothsayer and sorceress. 
Ḥā Mīm also had a sister called Ḍaggū who was a soothsayer and sorceress of 
great beauty. They used to ask for her succour in every battle and adversity.  
 
Such references to the role of female priestess-like figures adds weight to the 
possibility that the Idrīsid imamate derived some of its legitimacy from Idrīs I’s Berber 
partner, Kanza.  
These examples provide us with glimpses of a frequently hidden Maghribī social 
world in which the traditional beliefs of the Berber tribes began to be modified through 
their encounters with different early Islamic religio-political movements. They suggest 
that early Islamic or pseudo-Islamic political configurations depended on local tribal 
support and worked through consultative tribal mechanisms whilst superimposing 
charismatic religious leadership - often called an imamate - upon that structure. It is 
therefore likely that the notion of a contract between rulers and ruled in the post-conquest 
Maghrib followed the paradigm explained by Andrew Marsham for the early Umayyad 
bayʿa which was informed by ‘horizontal’ pre-Islamic tribal alliance making as well as the 
                                                        
9 al-Bakrī, Abū ʿUbayd, Description de l’Afrique septentrionale par el Bekri, texte Arabe, edited by 
W MacGuckin de Slane, [Algiers: Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1857] Paris: Maisonneuve, 
1965, p. 168. 
10 al-Bakrī, Description de l’Afrique septentrionale, p. 100. 
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‘vertical’ allegiance offered by subjects to their imam-caliph.11 Universal adherence to a 
single hierarchical political or religious authority such as the Umayyads or ʿAbbasids was 
notably absent. Different tribes or groups of tribes did not adopt Islam understood as a 
world monotheism but, rather, adhered to sectarian forms of it mediated by charismatic 
individuals, or created new versions of the faith relevent to their own group and its 
existing socio-political structures which may, on occasion, have included female leadership.  
These structures did not necessarily conform to emerging Islamic urban social, 
religious or political norms but this general pattern persisted for several centuries in the 
Maghrib. Its essence was captured in a small comment by the late Almohad and early 
Marinid chronicler, Ibn ʿIdhārī, who described the western Maghrib as a region where 
every amir ruled according to his own ḥukm, a term which seems to denote both custom 
(ʿurf) and belief, a situation that he contrasts with the rise of the Almoravid amīr al-ḥaqq 
(commander of [religious] truth or law) in the eleventh century.12 The move towards an 
amīr al-ḥaqq began in the tenth century as a consequence of the great struggle between the 
Fatimids and the Umayyads of Cordoba to control the western Maghrib, a struggle that had 
both geo-political and religious aspects since each side claimed universal caliphal status 
but as representatives of different interpretations of Islam, Ismāʿīlī Shiʿism in the case of 
the Fatimids and Malikism in that of the Umayyads.13 Religious exclusivity – the rejection of 
one’s rivals as infidels – was not unknown in the Maghrib but it became much more 
prominent during this period as did the idea of tribes entering larger Islamic religo-
political formations. It was probably at this point that the idea of supra-tribal Berber 
peoples became operative with the Zanāta tending towards affiliation with the Umayyads 
and many central Maghribī Ṣanhāja supporting the Fatimids.  
The clientage (walāʾ) with the Umayyads claimed by the Zanāta was not servile but 
highly contingent upon its socio-political value in the Maghribī tribal environment. Tenth-
century Zanāta chiefs benefitted, for instance, by their appointment as Umayyad governors 
of Fes, a position that gave them additional power and prestige in comparison to their 
rivals. This brings us to the issue of the triangulation between the tribes, the small but 
growing urban populations of the Maghrib and universalising religio-political rule 
personified in a caliph, an imam or his representatives with all its attendant rights and 
responsibilities, including normative urban Islamic social relations. Although coercive 
                                                        
11 Andrew Marsham, Rituals of Islamic Monarchy: accession and succession in the first Muslim 
empire, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009. 
12 Ibn ʿIdhārī al-Marrākushī, al-Bayān al-Mughrib fī Akhbār al-Andalus wa’l-Maghrib, edited by 
ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ʿAlī, Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2009, vol. 4, pp. 9-11. 
13 Although technically a legal madhhab rather than a sectarian position, Mālikī law did 
often play the latter role in the Maghrib where it was often synonymous with regional 
Sunnism. 
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power lay with the tribes, it was primarily in towns, where educated elites with some 
exposure to wider Islamic trends resided, that the parameters of the medieval Maghribī 
social contract took theoretical form and began to play a role in the urban exercise of soft 
power over the tribal hinterland. While tribes provided the ‘muscle’ for the construction of 
Islamic states in the Maghrib, it tended to be religious leaders educated in towns who 
articulated their projects, creating new urban-centric visions of the ideal Islamic state and 
society. 
This new relationship began to emerge as some tribes’ aspirations became more 
universalist and imperial in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, a period that witnessed the 
transformation from many amirs to the Almoravid amīr al-ḥaqq and then the rise of the 
Almohad mahdī and his caliphs, giving tribal constituencies a much larger stake in 
Islamised understandings of the relations between rulers and ruled. Both the Almoravids 
and Almohads claimed to be Islamic rulers and, therefore, engaged with the socio-legal 
contracts which held increasing sway in established (urban) Islamic societies, including the 
bayʿa, the dhimma, and norms governing canonical taxation which formed the legal 
underpinnings of justice, alongside more affective measures of performance that were 
linked to royal charisma (baraka) such as fertility, prosperity, and victory in battle.14  
Monarchical failure, perceived or otherwise, in any of these areas could trigger 
rebellions and even the replacement of one dynasty or regime with another, viewed as 
more properly ‘Islamic’ than its predecessor. Threats from non-Muslim areas, the Christian 
north of the Iberian peninsula and the pagan African south, placed a premium on ‘Islamic’ 
military action, therefore, jihād figured largely in discourses about legitimate Islamic rule. 
Its discursive power was further enhanced by the fact that society itself was not fully 
Islamised and that Islamising impulses had been historically multifarious and sectarian.15 
Equally important, especially in urban environments, was ḥisba, the maintenance of public 
justice and virtue by means of ‘commanding the good and prohibiting wrongdoing’ (al-amr 
bi’l-maʿrūf wa’l-nahy ʿan al-munkar), which provided the practical means to achieve a 
virtuous society, al-madīna al-fāḍila, among the peoples of the Maghrib. 
 
The Almoravids and the Mālikī ‘Amīr al-Ḥaqq’ 
                                                        
14 The sociological and performative aspects of Almohad power are explored in detail in 
Mehdi Ghouirgate, L’Ordre Almohade (1120-1269): une nouvelle lecture anthropologique, Toulouse: 
Presses universitaires du Mirail, 2014. 
15 I have discussed the role of jihād in the Maghrib extensively elsewhere. See Amira K. 
Bennison, Jihad and its Interpretations in Precolonial Morocco, London: Curzon, 2002; idem, 
‘ʿAbd al-Qādir’s jihād in the light of the western Islamic jihād tradition’, Studia Islamica, new 
series, 2 (2011): 7-28; idem, The Almoravid and Almohad Empires, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2016 pp. 28-30, 78-9, 86-7, 239-41. 
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The Almoravids or al-Murābiṭūn were Ṣanhāja Berbers from the Sahara, drawn 
primarily from the Lamtūna, Lamṭa and Masūfa tribes, who united behind the preacher 
ʿAbd Allāh b. Yāsīn and the Lamtūna chiefs, Yaḥyā and Abū Bakr b. ʿUmar, in the 1040s. Ibn 
Yāsīn was influenced by the Malikism of both Qayrawan and Cordoba which he used as a 
vehicle for the ‘true’ Islamisation of the Ṣanhāja and the hardening of their resistance to 
the numerous ʿAlid, Fāṭimid and Khārijite trends upheld by rival tribes in the northwestern 
Sahara. According to Ibn ʿIdhārī, he had tried to engage the Maṣmūda tribes first but one of 
their shaykhs replied to his appeal for them to unite as fellow Muslims, ‘None of us will be 
content to obey the rule of someone without a tribe’, encapsulating the religio-political 
environment described above.16 Under Ibn Yāsīn’s guidance, the Almoravids erupted from 
the Sahara in the 1050s to conquer what is now modern Morocco, western Algeria, and the 
half of the Iberian peninsula lying south of a diagonal line running from the Algarve to 
Catalonia. Although much of the contemporary writing about the Almoravids has been lost 
and we frequently view them through the hostile lens of their successors, the Almohads, 
certain instances in the medieval Arabic historiography of the period hint at their sense of 
Islamic society or, perhaps more accurately, the striving of Mālikī jurists and Arabised 
chroniclers to fit them into such a schema.  
Most notably, the Almoravid rulers took the title amīr al-muslimīn and proclaimed 
their loyalty to the ʿAbbasid caliph in Baghdad, just as the latter was emerging as the 
ultimate source of normative Sunni religio-political authority in the so-called ‘Sunni 
revival’.17 This was an unprecedented step in a region where previous adherence to the 
ʿAbbasids had been limited to short-lived rebellions in al-Andalus but it chimed with the 
affiliations of the resurgent Mālikī jurists of Qayrawan who had sponsored the early 
Almoravid movement and it gave the Ṣanhāja tribal chiefs at its head a new imperial 
Islamic status which distinguished them from other Maghribī chiefs in the way that 
adherence to the Umayyads had elevated certain Zanāta chiefs but on a much grander scale 
that transformed them into regional ‘commanders of Truth’. What this substitution of 
tribal for Islamic leadership meant to the Almoravids, their subjects, and their opponents 
remains a matter which can only be partly elucidated through analysis of scattered 
episodes and texts which preserve (or construct) a narrative of righteous rule. 
Within the extant chronicle tradition, Malikism provided the Almoravids with a legal 
                                                        
16 Ibn ʿIdhārī, al-Bayān al-Mughrib, vol. 4, pp. 9-10. 
17 The dating of this, like other events in the early Almoravid decades, is not consistent in 
the Arabic chronicles and may have taken place as early as the 1060s or as late as the 1090s. 
Evariste Lévi-Provençal, ‘Le titre souverain des Almoravides et sa légitimation par le califat 
ʿabbāside’, Arabica 2: 3 (1955): 265-80, pp. 268-70 ; Vincent Lagardère, Les Almoravides I, Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 1989, pp. 165-6; Amira K. Bennison, ‘The necklace of al-Shifāʾ’: ʿAbbasid 
borrowings in the Islamic West’, Oriens 38 (2010): 249-73, pp. 269-72. 
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framework for attacks (jihād) against their tribal rivals which first appears in accounts of 
their conquest of the important commercial centre of Sijilmasa in the Ziz valley below the 
High Atlas mountains in 1054 or 1055. Founded in the eighth century, probably by the 
Kharijite Banū Midrār, Sijilmasa hosted the Fatimid imam ʿAbd Allāh prior to his 
triumphant return to Ifriqiya in 909. In the ensuing decades, its Midrarid amirs switched 
their allegiance between the Fatimids and Umayyads until they were ousted by Zanāta 
Maghrāwa warlords whose allegiances were more solidly Umayyad. Kharijism, Ismāʿīlī 
Shiʿism and Malikism are thus likely to all have had exponents in Sijilmasa in addition to 
there being a thriving Jewish community. In addition to this religious variety, one line of 
traditions about the Almoravid conquest cites the oppressive rule of the Zanāta as its 
trigger and claims that on their arrival in the city, the Almoravids smashed musical 
instruments and burnt down wine shops.18 Sijilmasa emerges from this narrative as the 
antithesis of a ‘good’ Islamic society, characterised by religious disunity, tyrannical 
government and moral laxity all of which the Almoravids redressed by imposing just and 
moral rule upon the city. The reality was undoubtedly more complex: the Almoravids 
probably had not fully developed a translocal Islamic identity at this point and some 
sources recount that the inhabitants of Sijilmasa rebelled against the Almoravids, 
necessitating a second conquest of the town,19 but the symbolic value of the account 
remains.  
Another hint of the Almoravids’ claim to Islamic normativity occurs in reports of 
their conquest of Aghmat, north of the High Atlas, a few years later. Here the Almoravid 
amir, Yūsuf b. Tāshfīn, is described as imposing a heavy levy (farīḍa thaqīla) on the large 
Jewish population, implying the establishment of ‘normal’ dhimma rules concerning the 
jizya which may not have been operational in Aghmāt previously.20 The Almoravids are 
believed to have had a similarly strict attitude towards maintaining dhimma boundaries in 
al-Andalus. However, this is an area where the impetus probably came from urban Andalusi 
Mālikī jurists concerned that the Andalusi ahl al-dhimma should not have undue power, 
wealth or influence over Muslims, rather than from the Ṣanhāja amirs.21  
                                                        
18 Ibn Abī Zarʿ, Rawḍ al-Qirṭās, pp. 161-2. 
19 Ibn ʿIdhārī, al-Bayān al-Mughrib, vol. 4, p. 12. 
20 Anon, Kitāb al-Ḥulal al-Mawshiyya fī Dhikr al-Akhbār al-Marrākushiyya, Tunis: Maṭbaʿat al-
Taqaddum al-Islāmiyya, 1979, p. 13. This work has recently been attributed to Ibn Simāk al-
Mālaqī.  
21 The Sevillan muḥtasib IbnʿAbdūn, whose manual is reviewed below, was one Andalusi 
jurist keen to impose boundaries between religious communities that were clearly being 
breached in the daily life of Seville. Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. ʿAbdūn al-Tujībī, Risāla fī’l-
Qaḍāʾ wa’l-Ḥisba, edited by Muṣtafā al-Ṣamadī, Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2009, pp. 107, 112, 113-
4, 127-8; Séville musulmane au début du XII siècle. Le traité d’Ibn ʿAbdun sur la vie urbaine et les 
 10 
That is not to say, however, that the Almoravid amirs did not understand the value of 
the sharīʿa to their empire. Camilo Gómez-Rivas has explored the implications of the 
Almoravids’ adoption of the Mālikī madhhab not just as a legal school but as a juridical 
framework for empire, and in that sense part of the project to impose religious 
homogeneity under the amīr al-ḥaqq in place of the multiple interpretations of Islam at play 
in the western Maghrib.22 For the Almoravids, al-ḥaqq, a word connoting truth, religious law 
and the rights of God, was Islam mediated via the Mālikī school, its Maghribī missionaries, 
and its jurists from Qayrawān and then al-Andalus who joined the movement. The Almohad 
critique that the Almoravids were the dupes of a class of conservative and ill-informed 
fuqahāʾ conceals the importance of the Mālikī jurists in creating a coherent religio-legal 
system from Córdoba and Seville down to the new Almoravid capital, Marrakesh, and their 
Saharan centre of Azuggi. Whilst it would be naïve to imagine that the tribes of the vast 
deserts, mountains and plains of the region were fully integrated into this imperial legal 
administration, its reach far exceeded anything that had gone before. 
An insight into the Mālikī view of state-society relations in the Almoravid era comes 
from the famous manual of Ibn ʿAbdūn al-Tujībī of Seville on the judiciary (qaḍāʾ) and 
market regulation (ḥisba) which not only catalogues good market practice but also 
comments on appropriate relations between social groups and the ruler’s responsibilities 
in maintaining a good societal balance from the perspective of a practitioner rather than a 
philosopher. Like other Andalusi Muslims who served as Almoravid judges, officials and 
scribes, Ibn ʿAbdūn walked a fine line between supporting the Almoravids as protectors of 
the Andalusi portion of the dār al-islām against Christian encroachment and resenting them 
as outlandish desert tribesmen with only a bare comprehension of Andalusi society. His 
manual, therefore, exhibits a combination of attitudes ranging from idealism, promotion of 
his own moralistic and juridical agenda, and invective against the flawed social reality he 
witnessed around him.  
Ibn ʿAbdūn begins with the standard view that the ruler (raʾīs) is the pivot of the 
circle, which will only remain perfectly round and free from deviation if the pivot is true.23 
                                                                                                                                                                            
corps de métiers, edited and translated by E. Lévi-Provençal, Paris: Maisonneuve, 1947, pp. 
108-9, 112, 114, 128. For an analysis of these sections, see Alejandro García-Sanjuán, ‘Jews 
and Christians in Almoravid Seville as portrayed by the Islamic jurist Ibn ʿAbdūn’, Medieval 
Encounters 14 (2008) pp. 78-98. 
22 See Camilo Gomez-Rivas, Law and the Islamization of the Maghrib under the Almoravids, 
Leiden: Brill, 2014. 
23 Ibn ʿAbdūn’s use of the term raʾīs rather than amīr or sulṭān echoes al-Fārābī’s 
terminology but it may also reflect the fact that Seville was a governorate of the Almoravid 
empire and thus the seat of an Almoravid governor rather than the Almoravid amir and the 
existing tendency in al-Andalus to call political leadership riyāsa. 
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However, he knows all too well that it is rare to find such a man and he laments, ‘But where 
is he? Where?’24 The absence of a perfect ruler leads Ibn ʿAbdūn to identify the real 
lynchpin of the system as the judge, a Mālikī jurist, who must work with the political head 
of the community’s chief advisor (wazīr) to elevate the ruler’s aspirations towards the 
hereafter as well as the world and its pleasures. The shortfall between the ideal and real 
makes the achievement of a good society utterly dependent on the appointment of a 
clement but firm judge who can provide the necessary oversight of affairs assisted by his 
staff. In other words, it is not the Almoravid raʾīs who truly makes a just society in 
eleventh-century reality but the qāḍī.25  
Martinez-Gros argues that this position reflected Ibn ʿAbdūn’s own status as an urban 
Andalusī jurist who perceived the great mosque as the heart of the city and the judge as the 
representative of both religion and the urban population in the face of Almoravid Maghribī 
conquest.26 Intriguingly, there were a number of occasions in eleventh century Andalusī 
cities when judges did take power that may have inspired Ibn ʿAbdūn but many such 
experiments were shortlived and several such judges took the title raʾīs or amīr and 
appointed a new judge.27 Reality therefore presented the conundrum that the judge who 
desired to exercise leadership tended not to possess the characteristics required of both 
offices, suggesting that the two positions could not be conflated and, however flawed, were 
complementary in the pursuit of a just and stable political and social order. 
When Ibn ʿAbdūn moves on to the maintenance of justice, his first priority is fair 
taxation which may reflect genuine concern for the ordinary population or the importance 
of sustenance to his ideal city. Therefore, the group against whom he inveighs most bitterly 
are the agricultural tax assessors (al-khurrāṣ, sing. khāriṣ - from kharaṣa meaning both to 
estimate and to lie!) and tax collectors (qubbāḍ, sing. qābiḍ, literally a ‘grabber’) whom he 
sees as immoral, corrupt and sinful.28 His concern to protect the peasantry and rural 
                                                        
24 Ibn ʿAbdūn, Risāla, p. 41; Traité, p. 8.  
25 In the ‘Governance of the Solitary’, Ibn Bājja argues that the presence of a judicial system 
was one indication of the imperfection of a state since in the perfect city, everyone would 
agree and interact harmoniously. Ibn Bājja, ‘The Governance of the Solitary’, translated by 
Lawrence Berman in J. Parens and J Macfarland (eds), Medieval Political Philosophy: A 
Sourcebook, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press (2011), p. 100. 
26 Gabriel Martinez-Gros, ‘Le gouvernement du juge: Ibn ‘Abdun et Séville au debut du 
XIIeme siècle’, in Thierry Bonzon (ed.), Idées de villes, villes idéales, Fontaney: Saint Cloud, 
1993, pp. 37-49, p. 41. 
27 For a detailed exposé of these cases, see Maribel Fierro, ‘The qāḍī as ruler’, Saber Religioso y 
Poder Político en el Islam, Madrid: Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional, 1994, pp. 
71-116.  
28 Ibn ʿAbdūn, Risāla, pp. 42-46; Traité, pp. 10-14. 
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proprietors in general from harsh and oppressive taxation evokes eastern circle of equity 
formulations in which prosperity depends upon stable production and just tax collection to 
fund the army and government, so that the ruler is equipped to maintain peace and 
stability as custodian of the sharīʿa. While in al-Andalus, taxation was an accepted part of 
life and Ibn ʿAbdūn’s discussion revolved around licit and fair taxation, in the Maghrib this 
era witnessed the first major state efforts to actually gather rural taxes as well as the jizya, 
mentioned above. The Maghribī tribes may not have considered Ṣanhāja-directed tax 
collection as equitable at all and their rising opposition to the Almoravids in the early 
twelfth century may thus have involved resistance to incorporation into such an extractive 
Islamic state structure, the makhzan,29 as well as the theological issues foregrounded in the 
chronicles.  
From the tribes’ perspective, the Almoravids’ Truth (ḥaqq) was iniquity of economic, 
political and religious dimensions. The most fervent critics of the Almoravids were the 
Almohads, a coalition of Maṣmūda tribes led by Muḥammad b. Tūmart, a charismatic 
firebrand preacher from the Sus valley south of the High Atlas mountains, who criticised 
them for their cultural divergence from Islamic norms, the illicit taxation they levied 
despite their promises to the contrary, military failure against the Christians of northern 
Iberia and ‘ignorant’ religious leadership. The Almohad denunciation of the Almoravids on 
the grounds of religious ignorance was encapsulated in the accusation that they were 
anthropomorphists (mujassimīn) who wrongly understood Qurʾanic verses referring to 
God’s corporeality literally rather than metaphorically. Ibn Tūmart viewed this weakness in 
religious interpretation as a particularly serious issue because he believed that rulers 
should instruct and guide their subjects in religion, not simply rule over them and leave 
religion to the ʿulamāʾ. It was not enough to defer to the qāḍī: a perfect society required a 
suitably qualified ruler which the Ṣanhāja could not provide. 
The Islamic ideal of a universal religio-political ruler, an imam, had finally taken root 
in the rather unlikely soil of the High Atlas mountains among Maṣmūda Berber tribesmen 
whom the chroniclers agree were largely rural, illiterate and berberophone. The 
Almoravids had introduced a religio-political revolution designed to sweep away religious, 
legal and political diversity and institute a truly Islamic society in the Maghrib only to fall 
victim to their own success as the idea of an Almoravid amīr al-ḥaqq was replaced by that of 
the Almohad mahdī and his caliphs, who reconceptualised the Almoravid ‘emirate of Truth’ 
as ignorant, misguided and depraved. 
 
The Utopia of the Almohads  
The Almohad revolution which overthrew the Almoravid empire and established a 
                                                        
29 In Moroccan Arabic makhzan (storehouse) is the word commonly used for ‘government’. 
Bennison, Almoravid and Almohad Empires, 2016, p. 177. 
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new larger one in its place, stands out for its ideological radicalism and its self-conscious 
reenactment of Muḥammad’s prophetic mission. The career of the mahdī, Muḥammad b. 
Tūmart, was framed in later decades as a calque on the Prophet’s own career, replete with 
an iniquitous city (Almoravid Marrakesh), a cave retreat in the Sūs valley, a dār al-hijra 
(Tīnmāll), and a purge of lukewarm ‘hypocrites’ from the new Almohad community after its 
establishment at Tīnmāll. The chosen people in this scenario were not the Arabs but the 
Maṣmūda tribes of the High Atlas, assisted by other Berber tribes, who would carry forth 
the revived message of Muḥammad as explicated/voiced by the mahdī Ibn Tūmart and his 
caliphs, the Muʾminids, at a time when Islam’s true message was all but lost.30  
The Almohads viewed their message not simply as revived and restored Islam but as 
pure Abrahamic monotheism (tawḥīd) which all Muslims, Christians and Jews should accept, 
rendering sectarian division and the dhimma a dead letter. From the Almohad perspective, 
the multiplicity of sects and political fragmentation in the Middle East was a sign of religio-
political degeneration, confirmed by the successes of the Crusaders prior to the Zangid and 
Ayyubid responses. The loss of Toledo to Castile in 1085 signalled the similar bankruptcy of 
the Andalusi Ṭāʾifa kingdoms and the Almoravids who had failed to regain it. As a 
consequence, the perfect society which the Almohads envisaged was not the mature 
Islamic society of their day in which a variety of communities offered their submission to 
the Islamic political order in accordance with their beliefs as Muslims or as contractual 
Jewish and Christian minorities’ (muʿāhidūn) of one denomination or another, and received 
protection and justice in return. Instead the Almohad utopia was theoretically totalitarian, 
requiring the obedience and submission of all to the mahdī and his message, disseminated 
by cadres known as ḥuffāẓ and an upper echelon of ideologues called the ṭalaba, drawn from 
a variety of backgrounds, thus subsuming previous tribal, local and religious identities into 
a new hegemonic Muslim identity.31  
This entailed a radical rewriting of the existing social contract between ruler and 
ruled, whether Muslim, Christian or Jewish, which historians have viewed as abberrant, 
violent or intriguing, depending upon their perspective.32 The revolutionary conquest era 
presided over by ʿAbd al-Muʾmin witnessed preaching, religious debates and instances of 
forcible conversion in urban areas to religiously homogenise society. The Almohad era as a 
whole also witnessed repeated efforts to ‘command the good and prohibit wrong’ in order 
                                                        
30 The idea of the Berbers as a new chosen people is explored by Ignacio Sánchez, ‘Ethic 
disaffection and dynastic legitimacy in the early Almohad period: Ibn Tūmart’s translatio 
studii et imperii’, Journal of Medieval Iberian Studies 2: 2 (2010): 175-194.  
31 As Maribel Fierro notes, the Almohads may initially have called themselves, ‘the believers’ 
(muʾminūn). M. Fierro, ‘Spiritual alienation and political activism: the ġurabāʾ in al-Andalus 
during the sixth/twelfth century’, Arabica 47: 2 (2000): 230-260 p. 232.  
32 For the impact of the Almohad revolution on religious minorities see Author (2010).  
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to create the just and virtuous society envisaged by the mahdī,33 and, one might argue, 
attract the different communities in the empire to the Almohad project and give them a 
stake in it, from the ruling elite down to the subject ‘flock’. As scholars have noted, the 
Almohad empire’s ideology set it apart from other Islamic regimes of the time, in which a 
de facto separation of political, religious and judicial powers had occurred, by restoring the 
caliph-imam as the fount of justice, knowledge and prosperity that flowed down to the 
Almohad ruling class and then through society.34  
This idealistic and centralising vision is expressed in a missive from ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
to the Almohad scholars in al-Andalus, composed by the caliph’s chief scribe and advisor, 
Ibn ʿAṭiyya, on 16 Rabīʿ I 543 (4 August 1148). It places emphasis on the achievement of both 
justice (ʿadl) and virtue or perfection (faḍl), through ḥisba, enjoining the good and 
prohibiting wrong, one of the two crucial religio-political institutions covered by Ibn 
ʿAbdūn in his Almoravid-era manual, considered above. This gives some flesh to the 
theoretical bones of Almohadism and a sense of how the concept of a just salvific society 
flowing from the mahdī informed Almohad governance.35 
The letter’s context, the building of the Mosque of the Mahdī at Tīnmāll, the empire’s 
‘symbolic centre’,36 provides an opportunity to talk about the Almoravid era as one in 
which the wellsprings of baraka had run dry but now flowed again from the mahdī to enable 
the Almohad ‘man of knowledge’ (ʿālim) to achieve eternal life freed from personal desires, 
the need to oppress others and self-indulgence as he meted out justice within society. 
However, the letter states, the intermediaries between the enlightened Almohads and the 
population are guilty of many behaviours that compromise the ethical society envisaged by 
the mahdī and his caliph. The Almohad ṭalaba and tribal shaykhs must therefore take their 
positions of responsibility seriously and monitor affairs closely to avoid the series of 
wrongdoings (munkarāt) listed in the letter. These include several very specific 
misdemeanors which suggest real problems such as whipping people to extort money from 
them, levying illicit taxes and dues, prohibiting harbour entry without payment, and 
buying and selling slave girls without waiting to see if they are pregnant by their former 
master. The letter also calls on the Almohads to take action against the illicit sale of 
                                                        
33 For the Almohad view of ḥisba see, Vincent Cornell, ‘Understanding is the mother of 
ability: responsibility and action in the doctrine of Ibn Tumart’, Studia Islamica 66 (1987): 71-
103; Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 427-59; Author, 2016, pp. 246-50. 
34 Pascal Buresi and Hicham El Aallaoui, Governing the Empire: Provincial Administration in the 
Almohad caliphate (1224-1269), Leiden: Brill, 2013, pp. 162-169. 
35 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Naẓm al-Jumān li-Tartīb mā Salafa min Akhbār al-Zamān, edited by Maḥmūd 
ʿAlī Makkī, Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1990, pp. 187-203. 
36 Buresi and El Aallaoui, Governing the Empire, p. 156. 
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alcoholic beverages, and also against state couriers who impose upon the people on their 
route for food, shelter and animal fodder in an extortionate way, and the purloining of 
supplies from state storehouses (makhāzin) without permission from the caliph. 
In several places, the injunction to Almohad officials to exercise their faculties 
(ijtahada) to command the good and prohibit wrongdoing is combined with instructions to 
inform the caliph before imposing punishment. Wrongdoers should be arrested but then 
the caliph must be consulted and, on no account, should anyone carry out the death 
penalty without reference to the caliph, the supreme earthly judge, who will decide upon 
the correct sharīʿa punishment.  
 
Woe betide any one of you who disobeys this order about executing anyone we 
have mentioned, whether his crime among you is large or trifling. Instead bring 
his offence to our attention after imprisoning and shackling him so that we can 
punish him as we see fit and divine law (ḥaqq) may take its course.37  
 
This clearly points to the early Almohad caliphs’ insistence upon personal oversight, 
as deputies of God and the mahdī, and their rejection of the Almoravid amirs’ reliance on 
the jurists to make decisions. At the end of the letter, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin exhorts the ṭalaba to 
circulate it through society, giving an insight into the dissemination of messages from the 
top and the attempts of the Almohads to generalise their message and provide moral 
leadership throughout society. ‘Gather together all the scholars (ṭalaba) and officials 
(ʿummāl) in your regions to confer on this letter’ and make its implementation a priority, 
‘recite it to the masses (al-kāfa) from the tops of the minbars and summon the delegations 
from the tribes, both nomadic and settled, and make them understand it with eloquence 
and clarity (ifṣāḥan wa-iʿlānan).38 Then ‘When you have finished reciting it to the masses (al-
jamāhīr)…make copies of it for every tribe of the district (naẓr), and every province and 
impose upon them the implementation in all its facets of the task that we have imposed 
upon you.’ But also ‘warn them against opposition to it for there will be no excuse for 
anyone who does not make it his immediate goal’.39  
While the Almohad caliph appears in this missive as the true pivot of the circle, there 
is also a certain stress on individual responsibility and inclusion when ʿAbd al-Muʾmin 
explains the reason for the dissemination of the letter and the proper application of ḥisba 
using a Qurʾanic verse, ‘For God Most High says, “Indeed the believers are brothers”, so 
                                                        
37 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Naẓm al-Jumān, p. 196. 
38 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Naẓm al-Jumān, pp. 200-1. This formulation, ifṣāḥan wa-iʿlānan, may indicate 
the dual use of Arabic and Berber to ensure the tribes’ comprehension. 
39 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Naẓm al-Jumān, p. 201. 
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inculcate in them this fine belief seeking God’s approval’.40 This Qurʾanic reference elides 
differences of tribe, village or town in preference for the Almohad community of believers. 
At various intervals, later caliphs also took an active stance towards ḥisba and cultivated a 
sense of fraternity with the wider community. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin’s grandson, Yaʿqūb al-
Manṣūr, started his reign with a series of actions against moral infractions in Marrakesh, 
followed up by instructions to Almohad governors in other cities to follow suit. As Ibn 
ʿIdhārī puts it, when he reached Marrakesh for the first time after his accession in 1184, he 
was shocked and angered to find ‘wantonness openly declared and [people] competing to 
satiate their passions and business flourishing in the slave market for female singers and 
entertainers’. In response, 
 
He commanded that intoxicating beverages be poured away and prohibited, and 
warned that their use would be punishable by death. He dispatched missives to 
that effect to all the provinces and cities and the amount poured away was 
worth a vast sum. The letters putting this into effect included sections on the 
spreading of justice and insisted that officials and governors must treat the 
subject flock well with the object of giving them satisfaction in the fulfilment of 
their rights, the staying of the hand of their oppressors, and permission to 
plaintiffs and the oppressed to cross the sea [to see the caliph].41 
 
Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr also held public sessions in the great mosque for ordinary plaintiffs 
to come before him, including those with complaints against members of the elite, a 
process Ibn ʿIdhārī says was eventually halted due to security concerns and the frivolous 
nature of some pleas.42 
An unfortunately undated epistle presented to ʿAbd al-Muʾmin (d. 1163) by one Abū 
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Ṭāhir,43 a jurist from Murcia, preserved in Ibn al-Qaṭṭān’s chronicle, 
presents a more philosophical view of the Almohad religio-political mission. In his epistle, 
the author presents a series of proofs that Ibn Tūmart is the mahdī by means of a fictional 
dialogue between his ‘serene soul’ (al-nafs al-muṭaʾmina), characterised by logic and 
rationality (al-naṭqiyya wa’l-fikriyya), and his ‘soul governed by evil’ (al-nafs al-ammāra bi’l-
sūʾ), characterised by its habit of dissent and argument (al-nafs al-nuzūʿiyya). In the prelude 
to the dialogue, however, Ibn Ṭāhir describes his own situation by contrasting the decadent 
                                                        
40 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Naẓm al-Jumān, p. 202. 
41 Ibn ʿIdhārī, al-Bayān al-Mughrib, vol. 4, pp. 244. 
42 Ibn ʿIdhārī, al-Bayān al-Mughrib, vol. 4, pp. 244-5 
43 The editor of the Naẓm al-Jumān identifies Ibn Ṭāhir as the scion of the family which ruled 
Murcia during the Ṭāʾifa era. He was appointed as governor of the city in Almohad times 
and died in Marrakesh in 574 (1178-9). Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Naẓm al-Jumān, p. 101, n. 1. 
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cities of the Almoravids with the Almohad perfect or virtuous city (al-madīna al-fāḍila), 
using vocabulary and concepts evoking the eastern Islamic philosopher al-Fārābī and his 
western successor, Ibn Bājja.44 However, the aim here is not to explore the intertextuality of 
this epistle but to highlight the public presentation of such ideas before the caliph. The 
epistle begins by saying, 
 
I was anxious of heart and desperate for kindred spirits because I was living in 
cities of ignorance (mudun jāhiliyya) in the midst of corrupt and despicable 
behaviour, destructive rebellions, and circumstances altogether fearful and 
grave. Indeed every troublemaker among them encouraged forbidden evils and 
put pressure on us to join him in such perilous acts. Meanwhile I desired a 
virtuous city, just governance, and perfect lawful ways - migration to such a 
place is both a legal and a rational necessity, and may be viewed as a natural 
right - and I was a stranger in this world, so weary of life that it seemed better to 
die than to live but then one of the brethren came and informed me that he was 
one of the migrants to the presence of the imam of the Muwaḥḥidīn who was 
called in truth Commander of the Faithful, ʿAbd al-Muʾmin b. ʿAlī, may God Most 
High be satisfied with him, and I breathed in the fragrant scent of a lawful life 
and I felt in every fibre release from these cities of wrongdoing and ignorance. 45 
 
It continues to stress the wrongs in the Almoravid empire using established 
philosophical categories of imperfect states: ‘Are not the cities of the Mulaththamīn 
(Almoravids) misguided (ḍālatan), sinful (fāsiqatan) and degraded (khabīthatan), vile in the 
extreme, and dominated by force.’46 The author’s critique then turns to the crucial issue of 
                                                        
44 For a more detailed consideration of the philosophical and mystical uses of the idea of 
true Muslims as strangers (ghurabāʾ) in decadent times and how this theme combined with 
political activism in the twelfth century, see Fierro, ‘Spiritual alienation’. Since this epistle 
apparently predates the death of ʿAbd al-Muʾmin in 1163 it is earlier than Ibn Rushd’s 
exploration of similar topics in his commentary on Plato’s Republic which was probably 
completed around 1195. A. Chahlane, ‘Logique et politique dans les commentaires 
d’Averroes’, in J. Hamesse and O. Weijers (eds), Écriture et reécriture des textes philosophiques 
médiévaux, Turnhout: Brepols, 2006, pp. 1-22, p. 15. 
45 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Naẓm al-Jumān, p. 102. Compare with al-Fārābī, The Political Writings, pp. 60-1. 
‘The virtuous person is forbidden to reside in the corrupt regimes and it is obligatory for 
him to emigrate to the virtuous cities if any exist in actuality in his time. If they are non-
existent, then the virtuous person is a stranger in this world and miserable in life; death is 
better for him than living.’ 
46 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Naẓm al-Jumān, p. 103; al-Farābī, Mabādiʾ, pp. 252, 256. 
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the leadership provided by the ruler which reminds us also of Ibn ʿAbdūn’s lament that in 
practice it is virtually impossible to find a good ruler.  
 
The [Almoravids] drive themselves and the people to bovine acts (afʿāl 
bahīmiyya)47 and they turn themselves and [their charges] away from beautiful, 
lawful acts. They render the people mere instruments so that they can dominate 
them with wealth, honours and every pleasure. They forget God and He forgets 
them.48 
 
It is the role of the mahdī to ‘extinguish this fire’ and ‘elucidate the lawful path and 
the route to the afterlife’ rather than ‘the way of ignorance and corrupt, worldly politics,’49 
and he transfers this task to his caliphs who cannot be distinguished from him and 
perpetuate his presence, a task we have already seen ʿAbd al-Muʾmin and his descendants 
taking on through the public exercise of ḥisba and judicial oversight. The epistle then 
moves to the proofs that Ibn Tūmart is the mahdī, culminating with the mutual conviction 
of the two facets of the soul and Ibn Ṭāhir’s decision to join the Almohads. Ibn Bājja’s 
decision to retreat from the imperfect society around him was thus replaced by Ibn Ṭāhir’s 
more triumphal vision of migration to a virtuous city that existed through the restoration 
of law (sharʿ) at the hands of the enlightened Almohad caliphs. 
 
Conclusion 
This idealistic vision inevitably elided many of the harsher aspects of the Almohad 
political experiment and the limits to the forcible integration of tribes, sects and urban 
communities into the Almohad new order. Although these issues cannot be explored here 
in detail, it is important to note that tensions existed between the Maṣmūda Berber 
Almohad cadres and other Berber tribes such as ʿAbd al-Muʾmin’s own Kumiya tribe and 
Ṣanhāja ‘converts’. The status of Hilālī Arab tribal auxiliaries recruited from Ifriqiya such as 
the Riyāḥ and Khulṭ was also ambiguous and the extant sources do not describe them as 
‘Almohads’ suggesting only partial integration into the Amohad system. For the most part, 
the Almoravids were excluded from the new order and persecuted. The epistle of Ibn Ṭāhir 
justifies this by assimilating the Almoravids to the Jewish tribes who rejected Muḥammad, 
thereby denouncing both groups and all those who hear the message of the mahdī but fail 
                                                        
47 Although bahīmī is sometimes translated as ‘bestial’, the imagery here is not of wild 
beasts but of dumb livestock (bahāʾim) driven here and there.  
48 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Naẓm al-Jumān, p. 103; Compare with al-Fārābī, The Political Writings, p. 28. 
‘They rule despotically and set the inhabitants of the city down as things similar to tools for 
them to gain pleasures and wealth’.  
49 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Naẓm al-Jumān, pp. 103-4. 
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to accept it.50 Where the forced conversion of ahl al-dhimma, Jews in particular, occurred it 
went on to produce the same societal anxieties about their secret maintenance of their 
previous faith that all such waves of forced conversion create. The Mālikī fuqahāʾ also 
remained deeply attached to their madhhab and the majority never fully accepted 
Almohadism. Last but not least, the perennial issue of socio-economic justice through fair 
taxation and good governance was just as impossible for the Almohads to address as for the 
Almoravids.  
However, the very fact that in the mid-twelfth century a Murcian jurist could address 
a Kumiya Berber caliph using Islamic philosophical vocabulary of eastern provenance 
shows how far ideas of the ideal Islamic society had permeated into the Maghrib over the 
preceding centuries. In the first centuries after the conquest, it was the qabīla or tribe and 
the rulings (aḥkām) of tribal chiefs rooted in local customs and beliefs which dominated and 
the city was the imagined world of Córdoba or Baghdad rather than the bustling but still 
small towns emerging in the Maghrib. The rise of the Fatimids and the rival expansion of 
the Umayyads of Córdoba provided a catalyst for the Maghribī tribes to fit themselves into 
larger regional formations and this was followed by the great imperial religio-political 
projects of the Almoravids and the Almohads. The value of rule by the Almoravid amīr al-
ḥaqq and the Almohad mahdī, theorised by educated urbanites, depended on the belief that 
happiness was not simply a matter of this world but of the hereafter and that justice and 
virtue within society revolved around membership of the community of believers not one’s 
tribe, sect or town. Although neither regime could truly map their Islamic ideals onto 
reality, by the end of the Almohad era, the idea of normative urban-based Islamic rule had 
become generalised throughout the Maghrib and the sectarian tribal landscape of 
preceding centuries had changed dramatically and permanently. 
                                                        
50 Ibn al-Qaṭṭān, Naẓm al-Jumān, p. 108. 
